Both enfranchisement and disenfranchisement reflected this change of perspective, this look within. 5 To chart the transformation, this Note examines the debates over suffrage in the state constitutional conventions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as contemporaneous commentaries. Between 1787 and 1861 every state in the Union convened a constitutional convention in order to create a new constitution or revise an old one. 6 This intense period of constitutional change seldom gets the attention it deserves, partly because the Federal Constitution casts such a long shadow and partly because the scattered state conventions lack the same presence across time and space. Even so, it was inside and outside these conventions that the constitutional texts of the eighteenth century underwent revision; their assumptions questioned, abandoned, and replaced; the very meaning of American democracy defined. Many of these conventions allowed stenographers to listen, transcribe, and publish their debates, permitting their constituents and delegates in future conventions in other states to listen in and call upon the words of those who went before them. These words were repeated in pamphlets and newspaper and magazine articles, in effect creating a national conversation that spanned decades. It is over the course of this long conversation that we can detect the perspectival change discussed here. 7 This Note is more interested in describing a change in the normative perspective of nineteenth-century constitutional thought than in explaining the "instrumental" motives of the individual actors whom it highlights. 8 Such motives are important, but they do not explain why certain outcomes were individual [as the world became more modem].").
5. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972) . Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965) , the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Afternath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972) ; Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over desirable (or even possible) at any particular moment, nor do they tell us why once solid political positions eventually turned to mush. Attention to language does not deny the instrumental motives of individual actors. Just the opposite. A speaker's intention to communicate and convince must be presupposed; it is the intention that allows the historian to take the speaker's words seriously (which is different from taking them at face value).
9 At any moment in history, actors use and invent certain words and arguments because those utterances uniquely resonate at that place and time with their intended audience, resolving the contradictions of the surrounding world in ways other words and arguments simply cannot.'° A conclusion that the language of the look within simply perpetuated old status relations in new skins" would ignore the significance of the fight itself to the contestants, if not also the changes (however modest) that resulted. '-2 Part I will describe the external view that characterized the eighteenth century, and how its explanatory force gradually faded. Part I1 will describe the creation of the internal view, how it led to manhood suffrage, and how, at the same time, it continued to disenfranchise women and blacks. Part II will offer a brief conclusion, tying in some additional categories of excluded persons and exploring the limits of the look within.
I. THE EXTERNAL VIEW

A. Imagining the People
The crux of the Constitution's successful unification of a diverse country was its implementation of the invitingly vague concept of popular sovereignty on a national scale. 13 The people would rule, and rule actively. But if this [Vol. 107: 473 process of accepting the concept of "the people" was complete, 14 the more dangerous course of imagining who constituted "the people" had barely begun.
That was left to the states. In the name of conciliation and practicality, the federal constitutional convention recognized that "[t]he right of suffrage was a tender point.... The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper of their own people."' 15 Pierce Butler of South Carolina noted that " [t] here is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage."' 6 James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, concurred: "To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention."' 7 So the delineation of the nuts and bolts of political participation-suffrage, representation, apportionment, and citizenship itself-devolved almost entirely upon state legislatures or, more often, upon constitutional conventions.' 8 Inside and outside these forums, the idealized fiction of popular sovereignty met its uncertain reality. There, the uncomfortable question was asked again and again: Who are the people?
B. Property and Suffrage
When the Federal Constitution was ratified in 1788, nearly every state required some form of property ownership to qualify for the vote.
9 Most often this requirement rested on ownership of a freehold estate. 2 " The CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) .
14. That is, the acceptance of popular political behavior became accepted as normative. On the process of accepting the concept of "the people," see RICHARD BUEL, JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789 -1815 (1972 4 Others excluded persons on the basis of sex' and race.' But these last two restrictions were articulated less frequently, if only because (as a consequence of coverture or slavery) they were so often subsumed within the freehold qualification itself. By the early nineteenth century, with a new market society taking shape, 27 property was not the stable force it once had been. Now prized for its malleability and productivity, property no longer connoted the qualities that had made it synonymous with virtue and independence. 2 The assault on the freehold qualification, the paragon of trust for the old order, would not be far behind.
Propped up by supports that were no longer stable, the justification for freehold qualifications would gradually collapse. 29 Every state admitted to the Union after the ratification of the Constitution, save one,' rebuffed a property Letters, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 42 (1947) 33 the conventions of the 1810s, 1820s, and 1830s marked the culmination of the attack on property that had begun in the eighteenth century.
Confronted with this challenge, property defenders held onto their power ever more tightly and devised new theories of government to legitimate old political structures. They did so by refashioning the very logic of corruption and self-interest that had undermined their rule into a new political theory of interests. 34 Property defenders contended that there were two interests in society, personal rights and property rights, each "indispensable to every movement of Government. '35 Property represented a "peculiar interest" and therefore required an "authority proportioned to that interest and adequate to its protection. '36 This goal could be accomplished in several ways: by a freehold suffrage requirement to vote for representatives to either or both houses of the legislature, by a freehold requirement for office holding, or by the inclusion of property in the formula of legislative apportionment (in a Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982 (Vol. 107: 473 similar fashion to the U.S. Constitution's Three-Fifths Clause," which defined the apportionment of the House of Representatives).
Advocates of property representation did not impute evil motives or wickedness to those without property, only envy. "[Als all men know now," Richard Morris explained, "unless property is protected, it will be invaded."' 5 The principle of government, this theory stressed, should "not [be] confidence, but jealousy and watchfulness" of persons. 9 Only fools, argued Benjamin Watkins Leigh, would base a government on "the moral sense of mankind" when "self-love is the great spring of human actions."' Even "the highest degree of moral virtue, the most pure and unblemished integrity, and ... sublime intelligence, afford us no adequate protection: for men always have differed, and always will differ, in questions involving great and expensive objects of national enterprize." 4 If the power to determine taxation and appropriations were given to those who did not contribute their own earnings, "they may ... destroy those from whom it is thus unjustly taken." 2 In short, because government acted on the interests of persons and property, each of these interests should be represented in government."
The dangers that motivated the proponents of the interest theory of government were far from illusory. In the southern states, plantation owners feared that representation and suffrage devoid of a property requirement would give control of the legislatures to westerners who, desperate for new markets for their goods, would raise taxes on eastern plantations in order to fund massive internal improvement projects.' In the northern states, farmers feared that manufacturers would manipulate their workers to outvote the agricultural interests. The "manufacturing population must be mo[r]e ignorant, and more subject to an arbitrary or corrupt influence" than farmers, Jacob Sutherland of 37. U.S. CONST. an. 1, § 2, amended by U S CONST amend XIV. § 2. cf J-_NII-hR NEtDE..SKY. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) New York asserted in 1821. Workers "were liable to sudden, violent, and dangerous excitements" and, as "all classes of the lower orders of society[] are more or less subject to influence," they were easily manipulated. 46 Not knowing better, workers "look with something of deference and respect to the opinions of those who employ them, who consequently minister to their comfort or subsistence. 47 But the property-based theory of government was not simply utilitarian; property, for its advocates, continued to be the best test of character, just as it had been in the eighteenth century. While it "conferred upon its possessor neither virtue, integrity, or talents," Ezekiel Bacon declared in New York's convention, "it could not be disguised that ... it was a safe general rule that industry and good habits did in almost every instance conduct the man that practiced them, to some moderate share of property, and to a small competence, which only he would require." 4 If not a foolproof technique, the property qualification, he said, "furnished the most probable test of character, and the greatest likelihood of finding united with it independence, sobriety, and safe intentions." 49 Landholders, wrote David Daggett of Connecticut, "have too much self respect to endure the slightest approaches to slavery-they have too much at stake to tolerate anarchy., 50 Other defenders of the property qualification argued that the reverse was true as well: The absence of property, Warren Dutton of Massachusetts said in 1820, indicated that a person was either "indolent or vicious."' ' . "In every commercial society," Henry Ford of New Jersey argued in 1806, "wealth is the measure of respectability, and the foundation for that spirit of independence absolutely essential to unbiassed elections." 52 If nothing else, property defenders insisted, the consequences of suffrage expansion and equal representation were unknown, and therefore expediency demanded careful and deliberate scrutiny. The suffrage, they said, was entirely arbitrary; therefore, "[i]f it can be limited any where... it is a question of expediency at what point it shall be fixed. '53 Critics claimed the opposite was true, namely that money, in the form of property, corrupted. And though it was commonly "thought ... that poverty and vice are identified," 58 critics of the property requirement argued that, to the contrary, "more integrity and more patriotism are generally found in the labouring class of the community than in the higher orders."" 9 One simply had to "look to the higher classes of society .... [to] discover the grossest abuse of wealth." Land title failed to "contribute to the elevation of the mind, or [to give] stability to independence, or [to add] wisdom to virtue."' Nor did it give "any evidence of peculiar merit, or superior title," a group of Virginia non-freeholders asserted. 6 2 In fact, they contended, "were it not for the gravity with which the proposition is maintained, and still more, for the grave consequences flowing from it" the ascription "to a landed possession, [of] This skepticism in the attributes of property led Americans to search elsewhere for the location of the qualities necessary to vote. So, disillusioned with the adequacy of external characteristics as indicators of virtue, they looked inward. Section II.A traces the gradual realization during the first decades of the nineteenth century that these characteristics were to be found within all white men. Sections lI.B and II.C show how white men delimited this discovery by sex (by asserting a distinct familial role for women) and race (by asserting the uncultivated nature of the minds of black men).
A. Manhood Suffrage
Since property ownership could not be counted upon to guarantee independence and virtue, that qualification quickly turned into one of many ways to demonstrate a stake in society. By the 1790s, some Americans had already begun to explore the limits of this revelation. 6 8 A stake in society, they noticed, did not have to be immovable; a demonstrable interest or meaningful contribution could suffice. Any person who gave, in one way or another, to the administration of the state should earn the vote. "Does not the adventurous mechanic, who ... turns himself with steady industry to the pursuits of the occupation in which he has been bred, give sufficient 'evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community'?" 
1997]
means [and] all are entitled to the right of suffrage who have sufficient evidence of permanent common interest in, and attachment to, the community.
8 2 Even the remotest civic contribution conceivably could be construed as taxation and thus as ample qualification for the suffrage.
Provoked by these realizations, advocates of suffrage expansion developed by the 1820s a political theory of human nature to counter the propertyoriented, interest group theory of representation. The new theory postulated that the qualities of independence, virtue, and intelligence--once associated with property ownership-were in fact found within each and every man. "Nature has made no distinction among men," argued James Robertson in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1806.83 "Man is man, and it is not within the power of a freehold to change his character." ' "We give to property too much influence," one New Yorker concluded.
8 5 "It is not that which mostly gives independence. Independence consists more in the structure of the mind and in the qualities of the heart. '8 6 According to the Virginia non-freeholders, virtue and intelligence were not "the products of the soil" and "[a]ttachment to property [was] not to be confounded with the sacred flame of patriotism."" Instead, patriotism was "engrafted in our nature" and "exists in all climates, among all classes, under every possible form of Government." 8 Riches impaired patriotism more often than poverty. 8 9 Consequently, "the only effectual guarantee, against the abuse of power in a republic, is to be found, and to be found only, in the virtue and intelligence of the people, in whom all power rests." 9 As a consensus emerged that men inherently possessed the qualifications for the vote, property and even taxpaying requirements made less sense. By the 1840s, white manhood suffrage became the norm.
9 ' Nothing should "step in between [a man] and the exercise of his natural rights as a citizen," John Simonds of Massachusetts asserted in 1853.92 Simply because "accidents of birth or property" ' 93 may have made a man rich or poor did not make him less qualified to govern. The principle was, as Simonds put it, "that a man is a When suffrage rested in property, few questioned the gendered limitations of the vote. 96 Through the system of coverture, as William Jarvis wrote in 1820, married women simply "confered upon their husbands, by the marriage contract, all their civil rights: not absolutely .... but on condition, that the husband will make use of his power to promote their happiness, and the propriety of their children." 97 Because they could not hold property in their own names and because their legal statuses were subsumed in their husbands', married women could not qualify for the suffrage. By this logic, however, it might have seemed that unmarried women or widows deserved elective rights. But, as Jarvis explained, because "it [was] considered, that no practical inconvenience has ever been experienced . . . ,and that no possible good could result from conforming the practice of the country, in this particular, to strict theory," even these women were not granted the vote." 5 That propertied women lacked the vote, Edward Keyes of Massachusetts stated more than thirty years later, was "one of those accidents and misfortunes which is irremediable directly, but which is amply compensated for in a thousand other ways [and is a small sacrifice to pay] for the good of the rest of the community." 99 Though unmarried propertied women did vote in New Jersey until they were disenfranchised in 1807,"° men presumed that women really did not desire the vote. 0 ' Some argued, however, that women were competent to vote, regardless of their desire to do so. Defenders of the property requirement--eager to point out the inconsistencies in the arguments of manhood suffrage advocates-asserted that women (if they cared to) were just as capable of voting as men. "Can any gentleman shew me a reason drawn from nature," Philip Barbour of Virginia argued, "which subjects females, as such, and because of their sex only, to the dominion of men? 10 2 An unmarried woman, over twenty-one, he pointed out, was still "in possession of all her rights," and "those rights are by nature the same with those of the other sex."' 0 3 Men "merely as such, have no natural right to exercise any control over her whatsoever."'" It could "not be contended," Barbour concluded, "that females are to be excluded for the want of capacity."' ' 0 5 Capacity, however, would prove to be precisely the point of contention and exclusion. Advocates of manhood suffrage based their theory on the capacity of persons, and that capacity, in their view, was distinctly gendered. A woman's mind, they claimed, was "more fit for the sphere in which [God] intended her to act, [and so He] had made her weak and timid, in comparison with man, and had thus placed her under his control, as well as under his protection."' 1 6 Suffrage, John R. Cooke of Virginia argued in 1829, implied exclusively masculine traits such as "free-agency and intelligence; free-agency, because it consists in election or choice between different men and different measures; and intelligence, because on a judicious choice depends the very safety and existence of the community."" Women, therefore, had a natural "incapacity to exercise political power."' 8 According to this view, women's unique-though not necessarily inferior-capacity lay elsewhere: in their own domestic and familial sphere. 0 9 Women contested this characterization from the moment it was made. Cooke and his fellow Virginians, for example, were countered by "Virginia Freewoman," who, in a newspaper article published during the convention, questioned the assertion of women's natural incapacity to participate in politics." 0 [Vol. 107: 473 Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America of government, with as much independence as you do."" By the 1840s, a number of women, disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of their social reform agenda," 3 joined "Virginia Freewoman" and began to question the separate spheres ideology that shut them out of the political arena. Men, Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued, "fail[ed] in the business they undert[ook]," whether it was "in the pulpit, at the bar, or in our legislative halls."" ' "Now," she continued, "is it to be wondered at that woman has doubts about the present position assigned her being the true one, when everyday experience shows us that man makes such fatal mistakes in regard to himself?"" 5 If men did not fit within the idealized, ideological confines of their own sphere, why should women?
Not only were the accepted boundaries of men's and women's separate spheres incompatible with reality, women argued, but also the concept of spheres itself was flawed. To justify women's suffrage both women and men asserted the equality of the sexes. In the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1853, for example, William Greene used manhood suffrage arguments in this way to promote the vote for women. "The people," he argued, "are they upon whom shines that intellectual light which enlightens every man that cometh into the world."" ' 6 Women were just as "capable of receiving [this] intellectual light, [and so] are rational creatures, human beings, enjoying all the faculties which belong to human beings."" ' 7 Woman, Norton Townshend of Ohio said in 1851, "shares equally with man in all the rights that pertain to our common humanity, and .... I say further that she is man's equal in intelligence and virtue, and is therefore as well qualified as man to share in the responsibilities of government.....
If women had the same capacities as men, then they simply had to demonstrate a stake in society in order to qualify for the suffrage as it was then conceptualized. The married women's property acts were crucial in this regard." 9 "We already have a property law," Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote in 1856, "which in its legitimate effects must elevate the femme covert into a living, breathing woman-a wife into a property holder, who can make contracts, buy and sell.'1 20 "It needs but little forethought," she continued, "to perceive that in due time these property holders must be represented in the government.'' Using the familiar manhood suffrage argument of no taxation without representation, six women petitioned the 1846 New York constitutional convention on behalf of woman suffrage. 22 They argued that the state, "by imposing upon them burdens of taxation, both directly and indirectly, without admitting them the right of representation, [struck] down the only safeguards of their individual and personal liberties."' 1 2 3
Men countered these assertions of women's rights with an intense defense of the ideology of separate spheres. The marriage contract established a family, Abijah Marvin argued in the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1853:124 "In order to secure the rights of these families-these units, including all the individuals in them, however young, or weak, or imbecile-each family must be represented; must have a voice and a vote in those representative bodies where the laws are made."' 5 Why, then, did men represent the family? Because, Marvin contended, there is a division of labor ... between labor in the house at home, and labor out of doors; between influences exercised within the family, and without the family; between taking care of the family within the house, and providing for it, and taking care of its interests, by thought, labor, and other exertions, in the fields, the shop, the store, and the assembly. 126 The distinction between the sexes was ordained by God and had its origins in nature. 27 The family "can have but one will; and the man, who, by nature, is placed at the head of that government, is the only authorized exponent of that will."' 28 Thus, even if women were not confined by their natures to a separate sphere, "it would be a violation of the general rule, that the will of the whole family is represented by the man, who is the head of the family. Politically speaking, therefore, woman has no right to be directly consulted in 120. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan. 3, 1856) 1890-1920.at 42-74 (1965) .
132. See Counihan, supra note 44. Although this section discusses racial classitications onl,) %,nh regard to blacks, its argument applies equally to the treatment ol Native Amencans and Asian Amenc,ans. who were often specifically disqualilied as well. See, e g . MINN CONST all VII. § I u 1857) (amended 1960) (enfranchising only "civilized' Indians); OR CONST an II. § 6 (1857) (repealed 1927) (disqualilying "negro[esi," "chinamlein," and "mullaiolesl" While white men were inherently independent and resistant to every temptation to sacrifice their vote, a black man's vote "would be at the call of the richest purchaser," warned Samuel Young.'52 There were others who bypassed the question of capacity altogether and denied that blacks could ever vote because they were not citizens. With arguments that would reappear nearly twenty years later in Dred Scott v. Sandford,' 53 Pennsylvanians, for instance, asserted in their constitutional convention that blacks were slaves and not citizens when the Declaration of Independence asserted that all men were created equal.'5 Neither the state's Gradual Abolition Act of 1780' 55 nor either of Pennsylvania's previous constitutions"' granted blacks citizenship, these delegates argued. Therefore, blacks had no grounds to exercise the vote. Defenders of black suffrage countered on two grounds. Some who were pessimistic about the possibility of enfranchising all blacks argued that property gave some black men the qualifications to vote. In North Carolina, for instance, defenders of black suffrage argued that it was "a strange anomaly in a republick to deny to any free citizen the privilege of voting, and at the same time acknowledge that he is free, and tax him as such.""' It was not "right and just in us as men and as republicans," one author argued, "to disenfranchise a whole class of freemen, who contribute to an equal proportion to the support of the Government."' 5 5 This author invoked the principle of "taxation and representation, or the right not to be deprived of your property save of your own consent": This principle, the author argued, was "sacred and just in itself," even for blacks, and the violation of this principle would have tarnished the American system."' Only prejudice, another author argued, led to the objection "that free blacks are too corrupt and ignorant to exercise the The ownership of property demonstrated that there were "many of them who make the very best citizens and mechanics, and whose intelligence is far above the standard of mediocrity."'' Therefore, "those who possess such a freehold, which is seldom or never obtained except by the worthy, ought, for the sake of justice and good policy,... be distinguished from the others."' 1 6 2 This argument worked only in New York, where blacks retained the vote in the constitutions of 1822 and 1846, so long as they owned a substantial amount of property. 6 3 Elsewhere, the attempt to use property ownership to rebut the presumption of black incapacity failed. "
Recognizing that property arguments were no longer convincing, black suffrage advocates often used capacity-based arguments instead. Blacks meeting in their own state conventions' 65 [I]ntelligence and virtue are not the distinctive characteristics of races; they are not peculiar to any race; they are not monopolized by nor wholly excluded from any people on the round earth. Intelligence and virtue are individual possessions, inconstant qualities varying ad infinitum among the individuals of every people .... Those constant qualities which mark the different races are mainly physical, consisting of peculiarities of color, feature, figure, and 
